关于印发《安徽省城镇公有住房出售管理办法》的通知
安徽省人民政府
关于印发《安徽省城镇公有住房出售管理办法》的通知
省人民政府
《安徽省城镇公有住房出售管理办法》已经省人民政府同意，现印发给你们，请遵照执行。
出售公有住房是住房制度改革的一项重要内容，是筹集住房建设资金，加快住房建设的有效措施。各地要根据《安徽省城镇公有住房出售管理办法》的规定，抓紧制定本地区公有住房出售管理实施细则。公有住房出售办法已经出台的，要根据本办法进行修改、完善，保证政策统一。
出售公有住房政策性强、涉及面广。各地务必要加强领导，精心组织实施。有关部门要团结协作，密切配合，保证我省城镇住房制度改革顺利进行。
安徽省城镇公有住房出售管理办法
第一条 为了促进住房商品化、社会化，加快住房建设，改善城镇居民居住条件，根据《国务院关于深化城镇住房制度改革的决定》，结合本省实际，制定本办法。
第二条 本省城市、建制镇、独立工矿区内国家机关、群众团体、企事业单位自行管理的公有住房和房地产管理部门直接管理的公有住房的出售，均执行本办法。
旧城改造规划区的住房、沿街易改造为营业用房的住房、代管住房、危险住房、产权未定和具有历史保护价值的住房以及当地县级以上人民政府认为不宜出售的住房，不得出售。
第三条 凡具有城镇常住户口的职工、居民家庭，均可按本办法规定，向所在单位或现住房的产权单位申请购买住房。
第四条 新建住房以及腾空的旧住房，须先出售后出租，优先出售给无房户、住房困难户；已租用的住房优先出售给现住户。
第五条 公有住房的出售价格分为市场价、成本价或标准价。
市场价，按售房当年该类住房的市场平均价格计划。
成本价，按住房的征地和拆迁补偿费、勘察设计和前期工程费、建安工程费、住宅小区基础设施建设费、管理费、贷款利息和税金等七项因素计算。旧房的成本价按售房当年新房的成本价成新折扣（折旧年限一般为50年）计算，使用年限超过30年的，以30年计算；经过大修或设
备更新的旧房，按有关规定评估确定。
标准价，按负担价和抵交价之和计算。一套标准新房（建设面积56平方米）的负担价，按所在市、县统计部门公布的上年度双职工年平均工资的3倍计算，并逐步提高，2000年前达到3．5倍。抵交价按双职工65年（男职工35年，女职工30年）内积累的由单位资助的住房
公积金贴现值的80％计算。旧房的负担价按售房当年新房的负担价成新折扣（折旧年限一般为50年）计算，使用年限超过30年的，以30年计算；经过大修或设备更新的旧房，按有关规定评估确定。旧房的抵交价可根据使用年限适当降低，但最多不能低于新房抵交价的80％。
第六条 各市、县每年度出售公有住房的标准价和成本价，由房改办公同物价、国有资产管理和房地产管理部门按本办法规定的计算方法测定，报省人民政府批准后公布执行。
第七条 公有住房的实际出售价格，以本办法第五条规定的价格为基价，根据住房的结构、楼层、朝向、装修、设备等项条件和地段、环境的不同，进行合理调节。调节系数由各市、县房改办会同物价、国有资产管理和房地产管理部门确定。
第八条 出售公有住房按建筑面积（平方米）计价。
第九条 产权单位出售公有住房的价格，须由有房地产评估资格的评估机构评估（国有住房产权不清的，须经国有资产管理部门界定），经所在市、县房改办会同物价、国有资昨房地产管理部门审核后，报所在市、县人民政府批准后执行。
第十条 职工、居民家庭按成本价或标准价购买公有住房，每户只能享受一次（限购一套）。在省内易地调动的，原购住房由原售房单位收购后，在新的工作单位可再按成本价或标准价购买住房一次。
第十一条 向职工、居民家庭出售成本价或标准价公有住房，实行面积控制，其标准参照《安徽省人民政府关于干部住房标准和分配办法的暂行规定》执行，或按家庭人均建筑面积20平方米以内之和控制（独生子女按两人计算）。超过的部分执行市场价。
第十二条 职工、居民家庭按标准价购买现已住用的公有住房，可适当给予折扣，1994年折扣率为负担价的5％，以后逐年减少，2000年前全部取消。
第十三条 职工按标准价购买公有住房，享有一次性工龄折扣，即由售房单位根据购房职工建立住房公积金制度前的工龄给予折扣。每年工龄折扣的数额，按抵交价除以65（男职工35年，女职工30年）计算。离退休职工购房计算工龄折扣的时间，按国家规定的离退休年龄计算。
第十四条 购买公有住房，可以一次付款，也可以分期付款，或向房改专业银行申请抵押贷款。
（一）一次付清购房款的，售房单位可给予不超过应付房价款20％的折扣。
（二）分期付款的，首次付款额不得少于房价的30％，余款在规定的期限内按月偿还，并付利息，单位不得贴息。分期付款的期限一般不超过10年。分期付款的利率根据分期款年限比照同期城乡居民储蓄存款利率降低1．5个百分点确定（5年期以内的按同期计算，5年期以上的
按5年期计算）。
（三）申请抵押贷款的，须先在受理贷款的专业银行房地产信贷部储蓄房价的30％，贷款额不超过房价的70％。贷款利率由省住房制度改革领导小组会省人民银行确定。
第十五条 产权单位以标准价向职工、居民家庭出售公有住房，其个人出资部分在计征固定资产投资方向调节税时，适用零税率。
职工、居民家庭按标准价购买住房，免交契税；用于自住的，免征该住房个人出资部分的房产税和个人出资部分的三年土地使用税。
第十六条 职工、居民家庭按市场价购买的住房，产权归个人所有，可以依法进入市场，按规定交纳有关税费后，收入归个人所有。
职工、居民家庭按成本价购买的住房，产权归个人所有，住用5年后可以依法进入市场，在补交土地使用权出让金或所含土地收益和按规定交纳有关税费后，收入归个人所有。
职工、居民家庭按标准价购买的住房，拥有部分产权，即占有权、使用权、有限处置权和收益权，可以继承；住用5年后可以依法进入市场，在同等条件下，原产权单位有优先购买、租用权；原产权单位已撤销的，当地人民政府房产管理部门有优先购买、租用权。售、租房收入在补交
土地使用权出让金或所含土地收益和按规定交纳有关税费后，单位和个人按各自的产权比例分配；5年内确需出售的，由原产权单位按即时的标准价收购；分期付款尚未交清欠款的，不得出售。
第十七条 出售公有住房，产权单位应与购房人签订买卖合同，经所在市、县房改办审核后，分别到住房所在地的房产管理部门和土地管理部门办理住房过户、产权转移登记手续及土地使用权证变更登记手续，并领取统一制定的产权证书。
产权证书应注明产权属性，按标准价购买的住房应注明产权比例，产权比例按售房当年标准价占成本价的比重确定。
第十八条 加强售房款的管理。出售公有住房回收的资金，除提取10％售房款建立住房共用部位和共用设施的维修基金上，其余按下列规定纳入住房基金，专项用于住房建设和改造：
（一）国有住房的出售收入按住房产权关系和一定比例上交同级财政和留归单位，分别纳入城市住房基金和单位住房基金；
（二）其它公有住房出售收入，归单位所有，纳入单位住房基金。
国有住房的出售收入上交同级财政和留归单位的比例，由省住房制度改革领导小组会省财政厅另行制定，报省人民政府批准后执行。
第十九条 公有住房出售时，应确定维修服务的管理组织，负责住房售后维修服务（在未确定前，仍由原产权单位负责）。允许国营、集体、个人等多种经济形式开展住房的维修、装修服务业务。
住房自用部位和自用设备的维修养护，由住房所有人自行负责，费用自理。住房共用部位和共用设备的维修养护，5年内由住房管理单位负责，费用从维修基金中支出；5年后由住房所有人按占有房屋建筑面积的多少合理分摊费用。
第二十条 个人购买公有住房后，要服从有关部门管理，装饰、维修时不得擅自改变外型和结构。改造、翻建住房时，须拥有全部产权，并且要服从统一规划，按规定办理审批手续；拥有部分产权的，须征得产权共有者同意后方可进行。
第二十一条 售房单位不得用公款装修公有住房。已装修的，费用单独列出，全部由购房者负担。严禁将装修费用计入房价予以优惠。
第二十二条 凡违反本办法擅自降价出售和倒卖公有住房，使公有财产受到损失的，由房地产、土地、物价、税务、工商行政管理部门按各自职责，依法查处，并视情节建议有关部门追究主要负责人和直接责任人行政责任；构成犯罪的，由司法机关依法追究刑事责任。
第二十三条 1993年12月31日前出售的公有住房，须按售房当年的售价占成本价的比重明确个人拥有的产权比例，经购房人同意也可按成本价补足房价款及利息后，所购住房产权归个人所有。1994年1月1日至本办法发布之前出售的公有住房，一律按本办法的规定进行规
范。
第二十四条 各地、市可根据本办法制定实施细则，报省人民政府备案。
第二十五条 本办法由省住房制度改革领导小组办公室负责解释。
第二十六条 本办法自发布之日起施行。本省各级政府过去有关规定与本办法相抵触的，一律以本办法为准。
1995年2月6日
The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany
Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.
Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion
1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)
1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)
1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.
2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.
